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Deepwater sea ports are considered to be gateways for global trade and susceptible to a 
diverse range of risks, including natural disasters such as hurricane, storm, drought, as well as a 
course of events ranging from human error to malicious cyber-attack. To deal with cyber 
vulnerabilities, this study examines how cyber-attack to a given technology (e.g., Programmable 
Logic Controllers (PLC), Radio Frequency Identification Tags (RFID), Navigation 
Technologies, and others) impacts the overall port operations. We use Port of Pascagoula as 
testbed to visualize and validate the modeling results utilizing FlexSim software. Several sets of 
experiments are conducted to provide important managerial insights for decision makers. Results 
indicate that cyber-attack on technologies used by the port may significantly impact the port 
operations. In overall, cyber-attack has meaningful impacts on ports systems that may result in 
significant economic and operational loss as well as long-term security and sustainability for 
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Seaports significantly contribute to the overall economy of a nation because they are key 
components on a nation’s transportation system. In the United States and its territories, 
approximately 3,200 passenger handling facilities are located within 360 commercial ports. 
Among them, about 150 are deep water seaports, administered by 126 public seaport agencies 
(Homeland Security, 2016).  The primary role of seaports is to facilitate the movement of trade 
of both foreign and domestic markets. In 2013, more than 1.1 and 1.2 billion short tons of 
domestic and foreign trade, respectively, moved through United States ports (Homeland 
Security, 2016). There are more than 80% of the capacity of total goods is handled by ports and 
carried by sea worldwide (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2015). Convenient, effective 
transportation ports have the potential to significantly increase economic growth and success of a 
nation (Sleeper, 2012). The United State spend annually a total of $33 billion due to the delays in 
several areas, such as vessel technical malfunction, technical faults in port, failure in feeder 
schedule, or navigational hazards. Several ports not prepared for any attack or risk like cyber-
attack. A cyberattack can be consider extremely harmful for a port system because it may cause 
significant damages and losses. The decisions makers should be aware of these consequences 
and understand the risk of the cyberattack to limit the impact on the system.   
Nowadays, the adaption of technology is increasing rapidly and the critical infrastructures 
gradually become more reliant on them (Lewis, 2002). As the complexity and size of a network 
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increases, managing the security of a given critical infrastructure also increases. Among others, 
The World Economic Forum raised cyber-attacks as the third top global risk in 2018 (Insight 
Report, 2019). Different types of cyber-attack can occur in a given critical infrastructure and is 
difficult to detect them in the early stages. Cyber-attacks could be treated unknowingly or have 
some prompting behind them (Saini et al., 2012). Further, United States government fund more 
than $15 billion in 2019 for cybersecurity (The white House, 2018). The limitation of cybercrime 
depends on the appropriate analysis of their conduct and understanding of their effects at 
different levels of the organization. 
Unfortunately, most of the medium to small-sized businesses are not well prepared 
against a possible cyber-crime. Every enterprise has the risk of system hack, ransomware attack, 
data breach, or malware, access to the processing power of their network. These risks can include 
financial losses, theft of cargo or information, and strikes or malfunctions in security, which can 
lead to the shutdown of a port (Ho and Ho, 2006; Loh and Thai, 2015). Concerns due to cyber 
risks are increasing since the transportation network is increasingly dependent on the technology 
in their operation. Moreover, the nation's reliance on global mobility, international supply chains, 
and overseas markets need consideration of the threats to the vital worldwide transport 
infrastructure. Several federal department and privet organization contribute to developing 
security protocols through regulatory bodies and international agreements (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2015).  The damages from cyber-attack on transportation could be in profit, 
trademark, competitive position, reputation, and operating efficiency. Cyber security is very 
important for the maritime industry. According to the Naval Institute Proceedings, the shipping 
on maritime moves between 90 to 94 percent of world trade (CyberKeel, 2014). The value of 
goods is approximately $500 billion, or the goods worth more than $1.3 billion per day through 
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United States ports (Sands, 2004). The maritime transportation system is the most targeted in the 
world and suffers cyber-attacks recurrently (Belmont, 2015). Recently, the cyber-attack on 
maritime has been increase due to undetected and unreported attacks (Hayes, 2016).  Also, there 
consequences impact from cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure and operators of the system. In 
addition, the United States has more than 25,000 miles of inland waterways and there is a delay 
in the system by 49% (Infrastructure, 2017). Recently, Port of San Diego experiences a cyber-
attack on their system. Port of San Diego considers as one of the largest port in the United States. 
According to San Diego Reader News, the attack costs them approximately $30 million in losses 
and damages (Senzee, 2019). Another attack in control the cargo movement, between 2011 and 
2013, group of attackers’ breach information technology (IT) systems that controlled the location 
and movement of containers at the Port of Antwerp, Belgium. First, attackers send malware to 
employees in port to gained access to IT system. That access allows them to obtain the 
containers location and security details so they could change the container location and send 
drivers to steal the cargo before the legitimate owner arrived (Jones et al., 2016; Bateman, 2014; 
Homeland security, 2016; Daum, 2019).  
According to International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Automatic 
Identification Systems (AIS) became compulsory for all ship starting 2004. Also, since 2012 
under the same chapter, depend on the vessel type, they are required the vessels to provide 
information system and electronic chart display for navigation charts instead of the paper-based 
system as adopted earlier (Daum, 2019). Therefore, nowadays, most of the maritime system 
depend on Global Positioning System (GPS) and that create many vulnerabilities into the system. 
By using GPS, the system could have spoofed (send a false information) or jammed (lost the 
GPS signals) and if the GPS signals are blocked that will affect the other technologies such as 
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AIS, Voyage Data Recorder (VDR), Electronic Chart Display and Information (ECDIS), Vessel 
traffic services (VTS). One of the most prominent example of cyber-attack in maritime is the 
A.P. Moller-Maersk in 2017. Cyber-attack affected the systems caused disruption in loading and 
unloading of containers because of the impossibility to correctly identify the shipments that 
caused acute delays in the shipment in numerous ports, including Jawaharlal Nehru Port, Port of 
Rotterdam, and terminals in the United States with losses and damages of approximately $300 
million (Moerel and Dezeure, 2017; Daum, 2019). Further, cyber-attack on the maritime sector 
causes a lot of damages and losses because of the ignorance about the possible vulnerabilities in 
a given port system. Till now, numerous researches attempted to detect a cyber-event in a given 
system. In the domain of a maritime sector, there are several anomaly detection approaches 
currently available in the literature, such as signature-based anomaly detection (Roy, 2008), 
Norm-based anomaly detection (Riveiro et al., 2008), GEMASS (Genetic algorithm knowledge 
discovery for Maritime Security System) (Chen et al., 2014), and many others. Such detection 
mechanisms can detect threat on real-time and can alert the vessels. Further, Signature-based 
NIDS (Network Intrusion Detection System) technologies detect cyber-attack by realizing exact 
patterns in system data steams (Chiappetta and Cuozzo, 2017).  According to BIMCO (2017), to 
detect cyber-attack on the system, the industry should update techniques for reporting non-
conformities, hazardous, and accidents conditions that relating to a cyber-event. Then, if a cyber-
attack occurs in the system, automatically protective measure should repulse the cyber-attack 
effectively (Daum, 2019). Also, BIMCO (2017) provides some other solution if the system has a 
cyber-attack, such as check for the shore-based support and adequate resources are obtainable to 
help the DPA in answer to the critical system loss and update the processing of the implementing 
remedial activity to prevent recurrence that include cyber events. Recently, there are diversity of 
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cyber-attack on maritime infrastructures and vessels. Most of the cyber-attacks occur publicly; 
however, the information and details related to a cyber-attack are very limited. Botnet malware 
could provide the attacker some of the systems commends that could use with other system and 
with manufacturing cyber-event the attacker would control disruption or destruction of the 
equipment (Fischer, 2014). Maritime sector still has lack in the necessary incentives to improve 
their overall cyber security posture (Cimpean et al., 2011). Similar to other modes, maritime 
business experiences threats because of the dependence on technology associated with the vessel 
navigation needs. The vulnerability contains losing the vessel control or cargo that could lead to 
profit loss or consequences resulting from its use in acts of terrorism (Caponi and Belmont, 
2014).  
Deepwater seaport connected heavily with inland waterways ports, are increasingly 
becoming the cynosure of attention of the cyber-related attacks. Deepwater seaports are usually 
used for heavily and large loaded ships because the water depth helps the ship to enter the 
waterway. Further, deep water seaports are equipped with different equipments such as pipelines 
and pumping stations, cargo, service platforms, and berth buoys to help loading and unloading 
commodities faster. Essentially, ports play an important role in the economies of a country and 
their effectiveness can lead to significant economic benefits or failures (Dwarakish and Salim, 
2015). Some of the failures could happen from cyber-related attacks. These potential attacks may 
attempt to get unauthorized access to a computer system in order to compromise its data, 
information and resources, install malicious viruses or codes to harm the computer security 
system, and/or infect the system in such a way that resources become unavailable to provide any 
kind of services (Ahokas and Kiiski, 2017). Attackers may potentially hack different navigation 
vessels systems such as AIS, ECDIS, or GPS to change or control the vessels route for attack by 
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smugglers or pirates (Barnes, 2018; Homeland security, 2016). A prior study shows that ECDIS 
was not been designed securely, for example, accepting dangerous network methods, and that 
systems on these ships are often outdated and therefore lacking in some security patches (Jones 
et al., 2016). Security researchers also found ways to abuse the AIS, such as generating valid 
commands, changing ship courses, replaying commands, and tracking ships for potential 
physical attacks (Balduzzi et al., 2013). Researchers at the University of Texas at Austin (2013) 
managed to exploit the lack of authentication of satellite GPS signals, and successfully divert the 
course of a $80 million yacht with a GPS spoofing device. As the GPS receivers of the vessel did 
not authenticate incoming signals, it was possible to slowly overpower the authentic ones, and 
eventually gain control of the vessel’s navigational system without being detected or raising any 
alarms (Jones et al., 2016). Few deepwater seaport cyber vulnerabilities include: limited 
cybersecurity training and preparedness, errors in software, inadequately protected commercial 
off-the-shift technologies and legacy systems, network connectivity and interdependencies, 
software similarities, foreign dependencies, GPS jamming or spoofing, and insider threats 
(Homeland security, 2016).  
Most of the prior studies focused on identifying the vulnerabilities of a system and some 
recommendations of the appropriate way to protect the system from a cyber-attack. However, 
there is lack of information about the impact of cyber-attack in a deepwater seaport. To fill this 
gap in the literature, this study provides a simulation model to show the impact of cyber-attack 
on a deepwater seaport. The impact of a critical infrastructure depends on which deep water 
seaport are disrupted. The results or consequences of cyberattacks can be difficult to define, 
precisely because the damage can be greater than expected or known (Sanger et al., 2014). 
Cyber-attackers usually target port operators inside the port area because operators tend to have 
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fewer security controls than the port itself and are therefore easier to attack (Shackleford, 2015). 
Thus, this study covers both sea area and inland operation to visualize better understanding of the 
impact of cyber event.  
In summary, this study examines how a cyber-attack to a given technology (e.g., PLC, 
RFID, OCR, GPS, AIS, and others) impacts the overall port operations. We use Port of 
Pascagoula as a testbed to visualize and validate the modeling results. Several set of experiments 
are conducted to provide important managerial insights for the decision makers, including cyber 
vulnerabilities on PLC, RFID OCR, GPS, and AIS which significantly impact the ship and barge 
waiting time, loading and unloading time at the terminals and the overall delay in the system. 
This thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 described the problem and introduces the 
modeling issues considered to simulate the case port operations. Section 3 presents the 
experimental results. Finally, Section 4 concludes with a summary of the research conducted in 






AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY FOR MODEL VALIDATION  
This study introduces a discrete event simulation model capable of detecting the realistic 
physical dynamics in a complex system. This model is utilized to estimate and provide better 
understanding of the extensive impact of cyber-attack on deep water seaport system. We utilize 
Port of Pascagoula as a testbed to visualize and validate our simulation model results. This port 
is located on the southeastern coast of Mississippi. The port is important due to proximity to the 
Gulf of Mexico, where a large carrier of shipping and exporters are performed. The port has 12-
14 miles’ sea channel with a depth of 42 feet of mean water level. Further, it is the largest port in 
Mississippi and ranks the top 20 ports nationally with respect to the volume of foreign cargo that 
it carries. Port of Pascagoula is classified as a full service deep water seaport that handles cargo 
from worldwide. The port has two harbors with private and public terminals. Chevron utilizes the 
largest private terminal for processing, handling, and exporting chemicals. Additionally, this port 
annually handles approximately 32 million tons of cargo and is capable of professionally 
handling a wide variety of materials due to the availability of manpower, facilities, and 
technologies that belongs to this port. Port of Pascagoula serve both barges and ships in harbors. 
The right side of the harbor is utilized for handling oil with pipelines and tanks while the left side 
includes pallet (cargo) with crane and yard to move and store pallet as shown in Figure 2.1. The 
port has a narrow channel with 350` in width; thus, only one vessel can enter into the channel at 




Figure 2.1 Loading and unloading zone in the Port of Pascagoula (Available from:
 www.portofpascagoula.com) 
 
Figure 2.2 Visualizing the channels in Port of Pascagoula (Available from:
 www.portofpascagoula.com) 
Waiting Area  
Narrow Area  
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2.1 Simulation Model  
A simulation model of the port of Pascagoula is developed using FlexSim software. The 
business hours of the port in the simulated model is Monday through Friday from 8 AM to 5 PM. 
Figure 2.3 shows the operation flow of the port of Pascagoula system. Operation and processing 
are classified into three major activities: 1) sea area, 2) yard operations, and 3) gate operations as 
illustrated in Figure 2.3a, 2.3b, and 2.3c, respectively. Both the sea area and yard operations 
(Figure 2.3a and 2.3b) are simulated in this study; however, gate operations (Figure 2.3c) are 
not included in this study, and it is utilized in Figure 2.3 to show the overall operation and 
processing of the port of Pascagoula. After a vessel arrives in a berth, it has two sides to go 
through. The first side is for vessels (barge) loaded with pallet while the other side is for vessels 
(ship) loaded with oil. The operation processes for the barges loaded with pallets are: crane 
operation, cargo loading, and yard empty, respectively (Figure 2.3b). For ships loaded with oil, 
the operation processes are: pier, hose pipeline, tank, discharge, and fuel loading, respectively 
(Figure 2.3b). Note that the numbers shown in Figure 2.3 represent technologies used for 
different port operations and are elaborated in details in Table 2.1. The main focus on this study 
is to simulate and illustrate the impact of a cyber-attack on the port operation. Variety of 
scenarios regarding cyber-attack that may potentially affect these infrastructures and operations 




Figure 2.3 Operation flow of the Port of Pascagoula 
2.1.1 Ship and pipeline processing 
In the simulation model, berth can handle up to seven ships at the same time. Ships only 
handle oils in this port and enter randomly into the system in every 4.5 to 5.5 hours. The length 
of a ship is 500 feet and can handle up to 113,800 barrels (18,090 m3) of oil. Each ship generally 
requires approximately 2 hours to reach to the berth area from the initial waiting area (shown in 
Figure 2.4a), while it takes two to five days for each ship to perform all unloading operations 
(Figure 2.4b). Note that turning maneuver with the channel is difficult; therefore, it is not 
possible for two ships to move within the channel at the same time due to the narrow channel as 
shown in Figure 2.2. Arrival of the vessels (both ships and barges) to the berth usually requires 
the vessels to utilize the following technologies: Global Positioning System (GPS), Automated 
Identification System (AIS), and Electronic Chart Display and Information ECDIS as discussed 
in details in Table 2.1. GPS usually controls the other two technologies (i.e., AIS and ECDIS). 
These technologies allow the ship to send and receive information regarding location, speed, 












































Programmable logic Controllers (PLC), and Remote Terminal Units (RTU) technologies, as 
discussed in Table 2.1, are utilized to unload oil form ships through pipelines to the tanks. After 
completing the unloading operations, the ship exits the port utilizing again the GPS, AIS, and 
ECDIS technologies. It shall be noted that the technologies descried in Table 2.1 are very 
common technologies utilized in different port operations and the most candidate to be cyber-
attacked.  
 
(a) Ships waiting area prior to departure for leading operations 
 
(b) Loading operations of the ships 




Table 2.2 Technologies utilized in the Port of Pascagoula. 
ID1 Category  Technology Purpose 
1 
Vessel 
Automated Identification System 
(AIS) 
Identify ship as they come into the 
port. 
2 Global Positioning System (GPS) Provides geolocation and time 
information. 
3 Radar Determine the range, angle, or 
velocity of objects 
4 Electronic Chart Display and 
Information (ECDIS) 
Integrate position information from 
position, heading, and speed. 
5 
Fluid 
Radios Pump gasoline from ship to the fuel 
manifold. 
6 Programmable logic Controllers 
(PLC) 
Control pipeline meters and pumps. 
7 Remote Terminal Units (RTU) Monitor tank gauges and detect leaks. 
8 
Cargo 
Optical Character Recognition 
(OCR) 
Identify cargo. 
9 Radio Frequency Identification Tags 
(RFID) 
Identify cargo. 
10 Terminal Operating Systems (TOS) Help orchestrate the location and 
movement of cargo from ship, to 
yard, to truck. 
1The IDs use for clarification in Figure 2.3.  
 
2.1.2 Barge and crane processing 
The simulation modeling can handle up to four barges at the same time. A barge always 
transferring pallet and enters the system randomly on every 2.5 to 3.5 hours. The usual size of 
the barge is 195 feet without any compartment facility. The average capacity for barge 1,500 
tons. Each barge requires 8 to 10 hours for unloading depending on the type of commodities 
carried by the barges. Our simulation model includes four cranes to load/unload pallets from 
barges to yards as shown in Figure 2.5. Like ships, barges also utilize the same technologies 
(GPS, AIS, and ECDIS) to arrive at the berthing places from the initial waiting areas as shown in 
Figure 2.2. Once a barge arrives to a berth, cranes are used to load/unload the pallets from a 
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barge to a yard by using the following technologies: Optical Character Recognition (OCR), 
Radio Frequency Identification Tags (RFID), and Terminal Operating Systems (TOS) as 
described in Table 2.1. Then, OCR and RFID identify the destination containers of the pallets. 
TOS technology receives information from the OCR and RFID regarding the pallet location and 
then provides updated information, regarding pallet movement from ship to yard and then to 
truck. After the unloading operations are performed, the barges exit into the system by utilizing 
the similar technologies as described for the ships (i.e., GPS, AIS, and ECDIS). 
 
(a) Real port crane operation (Available from: www.portofpascagoula.com) 
 
(b) Simulated crane operation 






EXPERIMENTAL AND RESULTS  
This section discusses four sets of experiments to illustrate the impact of cyber-attack on 
a full-service deep waterway port. By assuming that a cyber-attack may occur in any specific 
type of technology, four different experiments are conducted, namely, cyber vulnerabilities on 
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), cyber vulnerabilities on Radio Frequency Identification 
Tags (RFID) and Optical Character Recognition (OCR), and cyber vulnerabilities on navigation 
technologies (e.g., Global Positioning System (GPS), Automated Identification System (AIS)) 
for ships and barges. The following measures are used to assess the performance of these 
experiments: total number of vessels (i.e., ships or barges) (i) waiting time, (ii) ideal time, (iii) 
processing time, and (iv) fluid level on the reservoirs (i.e., tank level). There is a total of 15 
replications simulated for each experiment and for a period of three weeks. 
3.1 Experiment 1: Cyber Vulnerabilities on Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC)  
The first set of experiments illustrate the impact of cyber vulnerabilities on PLC over the 
entire port operations. Essentially, pipelines are utilized to transfer fluid from ships to tanks, and 
PLC controls these pipelines (i.e., controlling pipeline meters and pumps). As described earlier, 
the simulation model can handle up to seven ships in berth, and each ship usually takes 2-5 days 
to unload. Cyber-attack on PLC usually affects the process of transferring the oil from ships to 
tanks. The performance measures in this experiment are: waiting time for ships to enter the 
channel and the total number of ships exiting the simulation model. Four scenarios are created, 
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namely, delay of 1 day, 2 days, 4 days, and 6 days on the oil transferring process, respectively, to 
assess the impact of cyber vulnerabilities on PLC.  
Table 3.1 summarizes the results from this set of experiment. Figure 3.1 represents the 
difference between normal scenario with the other scenarios (e.g., 1 day, 2 days, 4 days, and 6 
days) with respect to waiting time for ships and total number of ships exiting the system with 
statistical analysis. A t-groping test was conducted on these scenarios to show if there is any 
statistically significant difference at 95% confidence that shown in Table 3.2. For illustration, 
each scenario has different letter means that they are statistically significant different (i.e., 
waiting time of ships for scenario of 1 day and 2 day that assigned to letters “A” and “B”, 
respectively). If two scenarios assigned to the same letter, that means they are statistically similar 
(i.e., waiting time of ships of normal and 1 day scenarios assigned to letter “A”). 
Table 3.1 Test results of cyber vulnerabilities on PLC Experiment 
Scenario 
Waiting Time of Ship 
(hr) 
Throughput  
(No. of Ships) 
Normal 0 29 
1 Day 0 23 
2 Days 13 20 
4 Days 46 17 
6 Days 57 14 
 
Results indicate that the cyber-attack on PLC may not significantly impact the waiting 
time of ships in the port on the very first day, even though there would be a significant decrease 
in the total number of ships exiting the system by approximately 19%. Results further indicate 
that for a delay of 2 days due to cyber-attack on the PLC, ship waiting time significantly 
increases by 13 hours while exits of ships into the system is dropped by 39%. For a delay of 4 
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and 6 days, there is significant increase in the ship waiting time by approximately 46 and 57 
hours, respectively while the total number of ships decreases by 42% and 52%, respectively. 
Finally, results in Figure 3.1 illustrate that the cyber-attack on PLC resulted a 6 days delay can 
reduce the performance of the port by approximate 50% and increase the waiting time of ships in 
the ports for 7 business days.   
 
Figure 3.1 Scenario comparison of cyber vulnerabilities on PLC 
Table 3.2 t-groping statistical analysis of cyber vulnerabilities on PLC  
Scenario 
Waiting Time of Ship 
(hr) 
t-test Throughput  
(No. of Ships) 
t-test 
Normal 0 A 29 A 
1 Day 0 A 23 B 
2 Days 13 B 20 C 
4 Days 46 C 17 D 


































3.2 Experiment 2: Cyber Vulnerabilities on Radio Frequency Identification Tags 
(RFID) and Optical Character Recognition (OCR) 
The next set of experiments illustrate the effect of cyber vulnerabilities on both of RFID 
and OCR and their consequences to a given port. More specifically, this experiment focuses on 
cyber-attack that effect pallets harbor. In the simulation model, four cranes are used to transfer 
the pallets from barges to the yard. RFID and OCR technologies are usually used to manage 
cranes activities while transferring and identifying pallets. Six scenarios are simulated in this 
experiment to see the impact resulted from delays of the cranes process for up to 16 hours (2 
business days). The performance measures utilized in this experiment are: waiting time to 
identify pallets and move them to the right location in yard and the total number of pallets 
processed. 
The results from this experiment are shown in Table 3.3. Figure 3.2 represents the 
difference between normal scenario with the scenarios (e.g., 0.5 hr, 1 hr, 2 hrs, 4 hrs, 8 hrs and 
16 hrs) with respect to waiting time of pallets and the total number of pallets processed in the 
system. Table 3.4 summarizes a t-grouping test that is conducted on these scenarios to show if 
there is statistically significant difference at 95% confidence similar to the previous experiment.  
Table 3.3 Test results of cyber vulnerabilities on RFID and OCR 
Scenario 
Waiting Time of Pallets 
(hr) 
Throughput 
(No of pallets) 
Normal 4 179 
0.5 hr 22 173 
1 hr 116 104 
2 hr  180 58 
4 hr 216 30 
8 hr 249 15 




Results indicate that if cyber-attack is taken place into the system that results in delay the 
cranes processes for 0.5 hours, the waiting time of pallets will significantly increase 18 hours and 
number of pallets significantly decrease by 4%.  For scenario of 1 hour delay of cranes 
processing, the waiting time of pallets will significantly increase 111 hours (approximately 14 
business days) and number of pallets significantly decrease by 42% (almost half of the number 
of pallets). For cyber-attack that results in delay the cranes processes for 2 hours, the waiting 
time of pallets significantly increase to 176 hours (22 business days) and the total number of 
pallets processing are dropped by 68%. Further, for a scenario of 4 hours delay of cranes 
processing, the waiting time of pallets significantly increases to 212 hours (26 business days) 
while the number of pallets processed by the crane significantly decrease by 83%. Delays in 
cranes processing of 8 hours (one day of work) would result in significant increase of waiting 
time of pallets by 244 hours (30 business days) and significant drops the pallets handling 
quantity by 92%. In case where cyber-attack results in delay the cranes processing for 16 hours 
(2 business days), the pallets waiting time significantly increases to 251 hours (31 business days) 
and the total number of pallets processed by the crane dropped by 96%. The impact of cyber- 
attack on RFID and OCR for two business days would results in increasing waiting time of 





Figure 3.2 Comparison of scenarios of cyber vulnerabilities on RFID and OCR 
Table 3.4 t-groping statistical analysis of cyber vulnerabilities on RFID and OCR 
Scenario 




(No of pallet) 
t-test 
Normal 4 A 179 A 
0.5 hr 22 B 173 B 
1 hr 116 C 104 C 
2 hr  180 D 58 D 
4 hr 216 E 30 E 
8 hr 249 F 15 F 
16 hr  255 G 8 G 
 
3.3 Experiment 3: Cyber Vulnerabilities on Navigation Technologies for Ships 
This set of experiments illustrate the impact of cyber-attack on navigation technologies 
(i.e. GPS, AIS, and ECDIS technologies) that utilized to identify vessels location and directions. 
The experiment focuses in cyber-attack on navigation technologies that impacts the fluid side of 
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includes four berths with up to nine tanks and the other one (berth B) includes three berths with 
six tanks as shown in Figure 3.3. GPS, AIS, or ECDIS technologies manage ships entrance to 
channels until arriving to berth. Thus, cyber-attacks on navigation technologies would affect the 
number of ships coming to ports. To simulate this impact, four scenarios are conducted in this 
experiment as following: one of the seven berths does not receive any ship, two of the seven 
berths do not receive any ship, berth B side that includes three berths do not receive any ship, 
and berth A that includes four berths do not receive any ship. Performance measures in this 
experiment are: waiting time for ships to enter the channel, number of ships exiting the system, 
processing time, idle time, and tanks status.   
 
Figure 3.3 Simulated fluid side berthing for the Port of Pascagoula 
Table 3.5 summarizes the test results of this experiment. For clarification, normal 
scenario represents the normal condition of the port where all 7 berths functions, and 6 berths 
scenario represents the case that one of the seven berths does not work and the like. Figures 3.4 
and 3.5 represent the difference between normal scenario with the other scenarios (e.g. 6 berths, 
Berth A Berth B 
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5 berths, 4 berths, and 3 berths) with respect to waiting time of ships, total number of ships, 
processing time, idle time, and tanks status. Statistical t-grouping analysis is conducted to 
identify if there is a statistical difference between scenarios as shown in Table 3.6 (described in 
section 3.1).  
Table 3.5 Test results of cyber vulnerabilities on navigation technologies for ships 
Scenario 
Waiting Time of Ship 
(hr) 
Throughput 







Normal 0 23 20 7.0 83 
6 berths 6 22 20 3.6 87 
5 berths 32 19 17 2.1 88 
4 berths 64 16 14 1.4 83 
3 berths  100 12 11 0.8 96 
 
 







































Figure 3.5 Comparison of number of ships, processing time, and tanks status. 


















Normal 0 A 23 A 20 A 7.0 A 83 A 
6 berths 6 B 22 B 20 B 3.6 B 87 B 
5 berths 32 C 19 C 17 C 2.1 C 88 C 
4 berths 64 D 16 D 14 D 1.4 D 83 A 
3 berths  100 E 12 E 11 E 0.8 E 96 D 
 
In Figure 3.4, the waiting time of ships significantly increase from normal scenario to 6 
berths, 5 berths, 4 berths, and 3 berths by 6, 32, 64, and 100 hours, respectively. This shows that 
the cyber-attack on navigation technologies would results in delay the ships for approximately 1 
to 13 business days. Results indicate that the total number of ships reduced significantly for each 
scenario with respect to the base/normal scenario, such as 6 berths scenario reduced 3%, 5 berths 
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number of ships decreases up to around 50%. Further, the idle time reduced for each scenario 
with respect to the normal scenario. For 6, 5, 4, and 3 berths scenarios, the idle time reduced by 
49, 70, 88, and 89%, respectively. Note that the idle time is reduced significantly even in the case 
of 6 berths (reduced 49%).   
Figure 3.5 shows performance measures of total number of ships in the system, 
processing time, and tanks status. The total number of ships are described in the previous 
paragraph but included in Figure 3.5 for clarification with processing time and tanks status. 
Processing time of berths decrease significantly for each scenario with respect to the normal 
scenario. This is expected as the total number of ships also significantly decreased. The 
processing time reduced by 4 ,16, 30, and 48% for 6, 5, 4, and 3 berths, respectively. The tanks 
status increased for all scenarios with respect to the normal, except the scenario of 4 berths that 
has similar value as the normal case. This is because the simulation model includes a total of 
seven berths for vessels that located in two sides, the first one (berth A) includes four berths with 
nine tanks and the other one (berth B) includes three berths with six tanks as shown in Figure 
3.3. The difference in tanks number between berth A and B led to the tank status of the scenario 
of 4 berths value to be similar to the normal scenario. In overall, cyber-attack on navigation 
technologies for ships can affect the ports operations significantly with respect to delaying the 
port operations and processing time and the number of ships handled by the port. 
3.4 Experiment 4: Cyber Vulnerabilities on Navigation Technologies for Barges  
This experiment shows the impacts of cyber-attack on navigation technologies (i.e. GPS, 
AIS, and ECDIS technologies) that are utilized to identify vessels location and directions. 
Basically, it similar to the experiment of cyber-attack on navigation technologies for ships; 
however, the experiment focuses in cyber-attack on navigation technologies that impacts the 
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pallet side of berth which includes a total of four berths for barges. Navigation technologies 
manage barges entrance to channels until arriving to berth. Thus, cyber-attack on navigation 
technologies would affect the number of vessels coming to ports. To simulate this impact, two 
scenarios are conducted in this experiment as following: one of the four berths does not receive 
any barge, and two of the four berths do not receive any barge. Performance measures in this 
experiment are: waiting time for barges to enter the channel, number of barges exiting the 
system, processing time, and idle time.  
Table 3.7 summarizes the test results from this experiment. For clarification, normal 
scenario represents the normal condition of the port where 4 berths work, and 3 berths scenario 
represents the case that one of the four berths does not receive any barge, and 2 berths scenario 
represents the case that two of the four berths do not receive any barge. Figure 3.6 represents the 
difference between normal scenario with the other scenarios (e.g. 3 berths, and 2 berths) with 
respect to waiting time of barges and total number of barges, processing time, and idle time. 
Table 3.8 provides statistical t-groping analysis to identify if there is a statistical difference 
between scenarios (described in section 3.1).  
Table 3.7 Test results of cyber vulnerabilities on navigation technologies for barges 
Scenario 
Waiting Time of Barges 
(hr) 
Throughput 





Normal 0 44 20 8 
3 Berths 26 39 18 4 





Figure 3.6 Comparison of scenarios of cyber vulnerabilities on navigation technologies for 
barge 
Table 3.8 t-groping analysis of cyber vulnerabilities on navigation technologies for barge 
Scenario 
Waiting Time 
of Barges (hr) 
t-test 
Throughput 








Normal 0 A 44 A 20 A 8 A 
3 Berths 26 B 39 B 18 B 4 B 
2 Berths 85 C 26 C 12 C 2 C 
 
Figure 3.6 clearly demonstrates that such attack can significantly drop the total number 
of barges handled by the port over the base case scenario, such as 3 berths scenario reduced 12%, 
and 2 berths scenario reduced 41%. In overall, the total number of barges handled by the port 
decreases by almost the half. Processing time of berths decreases significantly for each scenario 
with respect to the base scenario. This is expected as the total number of barges also decreased 
significantly. For instance, the processing time of barges is reduced by 12% and 40% for 3 berths 
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for each scenario with respect to the normal scenario. For 3 and 2 berths scenarios, the idle time 
is reduced by 56, and 74%, respectively. The idle time is reduced meaningfully even in the case 
of 3 berths (reduced 56%).  The waiting time of barges significantly increases from normal 
scenario to 3 berths and 2 berths by 26 and 85 hours, respectively. In overall, the results show 
that the cyber-attack on navigation technologies for barges would result in delay the barges by 





CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
A full-service deep waterway port, even though carefully designed, is vulnerable to 
cyber-attack. This study examines how a cyber-attack to a given technology (e.g., PLC, RFID, 
OCR, GPS, AIS, and others) impacts the overall port operations. The author uses Port of 
Pascagoula as a testbed to visualize and validate the modeling results. Several sets of 
experiments are conducted to provide important managerial insights for the decision makers.  
cyber vulnerabilities on PLC, RFID OCR, GPS, and AIS which significantly impact the 
ship and barge waiting time, loading and unloading time at the terminals and the overall delay in 
the system. Some key findings obtained from this study are summarized below: 
• Cyber-attack on PLC, if not recovered up to 6 days, can reduce the overall system 
performance of the port by approximately 50% and increase the waiting time of 
ships in the ports for around 7 business days.   
• The impact of cyber- attack on RFID and OCR, if not recovered up to two 
business days, would result in increasing waiting time of pallets to 31 business 
days and decreases the processing of pallets up to 4%.   
• Cyber-attack on navigation technologies (i.e., GPS, AIS, and ECDIS 
technologies) for ships can affect the ports significantly resulting in delays of 
ships for up to 13 business days reducing the total number of ships handled by the 
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port approximately 50% and increases the idle time and processing time by 
approximately 89%, and 48%, respectively.  
• Cyber-attack on navigation technologies (i.e., GPS, AIS, and ECDIS 
technologies) for barges would results delays for barges approximately for 11 
business days, drops the total number of barges handled by the ports by 40%, and 
increases the idle time by approximately 74%. 
• Cyber-attack has meaningful impacts on ports systems that resulted in reducing 
the overall ports performance.    
This study can be extended in several research directions. First, our study ignores the 
interconnections of the reference ports with their sources/destinations. This is important since the 
cyber-attack will not only impact the base port but also to all of its connecting ports. Further, 
appropriate economic and risk models need to be incorporated with this simulation model to 
capture a realistic financial loss that a port experiences due to a cyber-attack. These issues will 
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